It is stated in paragraph 9 of the judgement:

It is stated in paragraph 9 of the judgement:

“I have to assess whether the claim to asylum is well-founded on the evidence as a whole, going to past, present and future and according to the criterion of reasonable degree of likelihood as stated above I have also to assess the degree of risk facing the appellant now at the date of making this determination Sandralingham and Ravichandran [1996] Imm AR 97, Koyazia Kaj (11038).”

The judge did not consider the past, present and future as she states in the judgement on the question of likelihood of persecution if the appellant is removed from the UK. The standard of proof required for such consideration is a low threshold. In deciding whether there is a likelihood of persecution, as also laid down by the court in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449, [469] that court does not have to limited to rules of evidence that are followed in civil litigation and:

is bound to take into account all material considerations when making its assessment about the future…. What it does mean, on the other hand, is that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur...

It is stated in paragraph 11 of the judgement:

“Having considered the matter independently of the Secretary of State I agree that Dr. Murray is not an expert on physical evidence of torture. Further in my view these injuries could have been caused by the appellant’s mode of travel to the UK or her apple picking activities.”

Furthermore, in paragraph 12 of the judgement, the judge states: “As for the psychological report by Dr. X Pert, with the greatest of respect to the renowned doctor, it is a report on what the appellant has told him.”

The judge has failed to give careful and serious consideration to the expert opinions given by the two doctors. This is contrary to the principle laid down in Virjon B v Special Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 1469 (Admin), wherein the court has approved the following statement of the tribunal in Ibrahim v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] INLR 511:

"Any medical or psychiatric report deserves careful and specific consideration, bearing in mind, particularly, that there may be psychological consequences from ill-treatment which may affect the evidence which is given by an applicant."

In paragraph 27 of the judgement, the judge states:

“Finally, having given all the evidence and submissions my “anxious scrutiny”, my finding is that the appellant has never been persecuted in Poland or North Korea. Further, my finding is that it is beyond all reasonable doubt that she will be safe now or in the future when she returns to Poland.”

The judge has failed to exercise anxious scrutiny, which is an essential task in cases, where decisions made by the court have implications for right to life of the appellant. As laid down in Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, the right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights. Therefore, where decisions have implications for this right, the basis of the decision should be the most anxious scrutiny by the judge. In this case, the judge has failed to consider expert medical testimony relating to the injuries of the appellant caused through possible torture. The judge has also applied a higher threshold test for testing whether there are reasonable grounds for a belief of persecution if the appellant is deported. It is submitted that in this case, an ‘anxious scrutiny’ by the judge is not indicated.